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Abstract—Modern electricity markets conduct a two-
settlement procedure. Ahead of time, they allocate definite
supply as well as reserves. Close to the time of consumption,
they balance supply and demand. Bidding in these two auctions
poses a challenge for automated bidding by agents, which will
be more common in future electricity markets and so-called
“smart grids”. In a decision-theoretic model, we implement
the current bidding practice that uses two independent bids
and a novel, unified format that simplifies computation. We
show through Monte-Carlo simulations in one-shot settings
that the unified format restricts market power of suppliers in
exploitable settings, and is also less vulnerable to uncertainty
of bidders about market outcomes.
Keywords-Power System Economics, Electronic Commerce,
Smart Grids
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal engineering challenge in power systems is
to keep costs of production low and to maintain a constant
balance between supply and demand. The ongoing deregu-
lation of electricity markets adds the challenge to increase
competition in markets with (currently) high concentration
of market power at the suppliers. At the same time, both
more volatile generation methods (e.g. renewables) as well
as more flexible technological components are being intro-
duced, while electricity remains difficult to store. Based on
these developments, the “smart grid” concept envisions more
dynamic pricing and more decisions made close to the time
of consumption. Intelligent agents can potentially take over
many planning decisions and place bids in the name of their
owners. but for this an advancement in the understanding
of the dynamics and proposals for computationally efficient
mechanisms are needed.
This work builds on a type of market allocation mech-
anism that combines ahead-planning with dynamic pricing.
The two-settlement procedure, which is currently being used
in many deregulated electricity markets, trades a continuous
good (electricity) in two different markets. The first settle-
ment clears an “ahead market” (usually one day ahead of
time, but shorter intervals are possible in more dynamic
market settings, e.g. in “smart grids”). Generators submit
a bid to sell some quantity definitively. The ahead market
also allocates an additional quantity from generators, but
only as an option. The second settlement clears a ”balancing
market”. Generators submit a bid in order to sell some part
of this option to even out short-term imbalances.
Specifically, fast-reacting generators like gas power plants
or batteries will become more valuable, in order to act as
reserve power in the balancing market. It is, however, not
settled how to allocate quantities and prices for balancing
markets. Is the quantity of needed reserves chosen inde-
pendently from the quantity of definitely allocated power?
Should power only be paid for when it is used for balancing
or should the market pay for the availability of fast-startable
reserve capacity, regardless of whether it is put to use? This
paper uses a version of the two-settlement procedure in
which the market maker allocates reserve capacity relative
to definitely allocated capacity and dynamically sets prices
for electricity which is actually used for balancing.
Bidding in the two-settlement procedure is complex and it
is not well-understood how intelligent agents would perform.
In a decision-theoretic model, we investigate the profit
maximisation problem of a generator on an ahead market
(that is part of the two-settlement procedure) and its effects
on market prices and the market power of the generator. In
a parallel companion work [4] to this work, we investigate
the suitability of this format for a flexible consumer.
We advance the state of the art in the following ways:
First, we extensively model the decision problem for a
smart bidding agent (who is able to offer reserve capacity
to the balancing market) in the two-settlement model by
implementing the current practice, where separate bids are
made for definitively sold power and reserve power. Second,
we implement a unified bid format that was proposed by
the authors in [5] into this model. The format simplifies
the optimisation problem of the bidding agent substantially.
Finally, we study varying what-if scenarios with stochastic
Monte-Carlo simulations. Experimental evidence shows that
the combined format is appealing to market makers, as it
restricts the exercise of excessive market power by bidders
in exploitable market settings (compared to a non-unified
approach). It is also appealing to bidders, as it shows a good
performance in all other settings and is less vulnerable to
increasing uncertainty about market outcomes.
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II. BACKGROUND
Modern electricity markets are centralised, two-sided
multi-unit auctions, which are challenging to analyse. They
have often used uniform-price auctions (UPA) designs, in
which all participants pay or earn the same unit price. The
last decade has seen more markets designed as discrimi-
natory pricing auctions (DPA)[7], in which unit prices may
differ based on individual bids. Generally, UPA settings have
been found to result in more efficient allocations, but DPA
designs lower prices and market power of suppliers, see
for example Fabra et al. (2002) [3] and Damianov et al.
(2010) [2]. This paper models a DPA design.
A very common (e.g. [6], [1], [14]) mathematical model
of bids in electricity markets are supply functions, based on
a quadratic representation of total production costs: f(Q) =
cQ + RQn. This makes the assumption that there are no
fixed costs. Q denotes a quantity of electricity and c ∈ R
and R ∈ R are coefficients. Also, c > 0, R > 0 and n > 1.
Market power, defined as “the ability to alter profitably
prices away from competitive levels” [9], lies currently
mainly with suppliers, who face inelastic demand. To tackle
this problem, electricity market designers have been search-
ing for the best trade-off in bid format design, which allows
bidders to freely express their economic preferences, but
also restricts them artificially in order to limit prices and
the exercise of market power. For instance, Baldick (2002)
[1] mentions that quadratic terms in the bids could be limited
or bids could be required to be consistent across time.
In the two-settlement procedure described above, the
market maker procures reserve energy. The required optimal
quantity is currently chosen by static heuristics, for exam-
ple based on the capacity of the largest power plant, by
remaining capacity in allocated generation facilities, or on a
percentage of peak capacity in the market. Although they are
delivered together as an indistinguishable product, definitive
and reserve electricity are priced independently. An impor-
tant question is when to submit the supply bids for each type.
Most scientific literature favours simultaneous approaches
(submit at the same time) over sequential ones (submit
bids for reserve electricity after the market for definitive
electricity has been cleared). In sequential approaches, re-
commitments can lead to inefficient allocations.
However, a problem with simultaneous approaches is
that a bid in one market cannot refer to outcomes in the
other market. This reduces chances of reaching efficient
allocations. Only few proposals to tackle this problem exist.
For example, Virag et al. (2011) [15] propose an iterative
market design, where in each round the market maker
proposes two market prices and the market participants
update the quantities they would sell or buy at those prices.
This runs until conversion, but the runtime properties of this
dynamic method are uncertain. The problem has also been
discussed in Ho¨ning et al. (2011) [5], where a combined
bid format is proposed for the two-settlement procedure
which allocates reserve quantities relative to definitely sold
quantities. and a preliminary market clearing mechanism
was sketched as constraint satisfaction problem. This paper
analyses the performance of this bid format as described in
Section I, from the viewpoint of a bidder.
III. MODEL
We consider a generator g using a decision-theoretic ap-
proach. g aims at maximising profits from selling electricity
in the two markets and his task is to construct appropriate
bids for this. In this section, we describe the mathematical
form of bids, the ahead market A, the balancing market B
and g’s profit maximisation problem.
A. Mathematical form of bids
We denote the maximal production capacity of any gen-
erator h with QUh and h’s total cost function by Ch(Q) =
chQ + RhQ2, where Q is a quantity of electricity. In our
market model, bids are supply functions and map unit prices
to quantities (to model the current practice, market B also
accepts a constant price bid, see Section IV). A bid by
generator h is a linear function. It is based on C ′h
−1, the
inverse derivative of the total cost function Ch, wherein h
can adapt the minimal offer price per unit ch.
First, C ′h
−1 is derived as follows: Let C ′h be the derivative
of Ch and ρm be the marginal unit cost related to a quantity
of power Q (i.e. ρm equals the costs of the last produced
unit). Then, C ′h(Q) = ch + 2RhQ = ρm. We can invert C
′
h
by solving for Q, thus Q = 12Rh (ρm− ch) = C ′h
−1(ρm). In
economic theory, C ′h
−1 is called the marginal cost function
and represents the profit-maximising bid in a perfectly
competitive market [12]. For comparison, the average unit
cost function is the inverse of Ch(Q)Q , which is
1
Rh
(ρt− ch),
where ρt is the average unit cost. Second, h can construct
a bid bh in order to maximise profits by deviating from
both his ch and Rh value. For simplicity, we fix Rh and
restrict h to adapt only the parameter ch. We represent
this by: bh(ρ) = 12Rh (ρ − c∗h), where ρ is a unit price
and c∗h is the parameter that h can freely choose. In [1],
this restriction of the function parametrisation is called “c-
parametrisation” and previous literature that also used this
restriction is described.
B. The two markets
Let the overall offered quantity be QU . Each generator
h submits bids bAh and b
B
h for both markets simultaneously,
before market A is cleared. We call the market maker SO
(which is short for System Operator). The SO uses all bids
bAh to clear the aggregate demand on market A. The SO
definitely buys one part of QU , called QA. Another part,
called Qopt, is allocated as an option on electricity and
determined by the SO alone. Later in market B, some part
QB ∈ [0, Qopt] of this option might be bought. When the
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demand side announces their demand in market B, all supply
bids bBh are used to clear market B.
This work models the decision problem of one generator
agent g. In both markets, we model the residual demand
function Dg that g effectively faces, given demand and sup-
ply from all other market participants. The residual demand
is the full market demand minus the quantity supplied by
other generators at each unit price ρ [12]. Thus, let D(ρ)→
R be an aggregated demand function and S−g(ρ) → R
an aggregated supply function, where S−g aggregates all
generators besides g. Then, Dg(ρ) = D(ρ) − S−g(ρ).
Following [12], the latter functions are given by:
D(ρ) = Dmax − αρ
S−g(ρ) = β(ρ− ρmin)
(1)
where Dmax denotes the maximal demand (if price is zero),
α denotes the slope of D, ρmin denotes the minimal unit
offer price and β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the slope of S−g . Dg is
given by:
Dg(ρ) = D(ρ)− S−g(ρ)
= Dmax + βρmin − ρ(α + β)
(2)
Market clearing works as follows: Given g’s bid bg , the
quantity Qg that g sells and the unit price ρb that g earns
are found at the intersection of residual demand and g’s bid,
thus Dg(ρb) = bg(ρb). However, we also need to consider
outcomes of this intersection that would lead to invalid
quantities (quantities which g is not able to produce). g can
not produce negative quantities, so if Dg(ρb) < 0, g sells
nothing, as his bid bg was too expensive. Furthermore, we
model an individual maximal capacity constraint Qmaxg for
bg (for S−g , we assume that individual capacity constraints
of the aggregated suppliers are not exceeded and thus not
relevant for the market clearing). g is willing to sell Qmaxg
at price ρb,max (thus, bg(ρb,max) = Qmaxg ) and the SO
is willing to pay ρD,max (thus, Dg(ρD,max) = Qmaxg ).
If bg(ρb) > Qmaxg (see Figure 1 for illustration), we use
a discriminative (also called pay-as-bid) auction approach
[7], such that g will sell Qmaxg at a unit price of ρb,max if
ρb,max ≤ ρD,max or sell nothing otherwise.
From now on, we denote with QAg , Q
opt
g and Q
B
g the
quantities allocated to g and with ρAg and ρ
B
g the unit prices
that g earns on markets A and B, respectively. For g’s
competitors, we denote with QA−g and Q
B
−g the quantities
that they sell and with ρA−g and ρ
B
−g the prices they earn.
Markets A and B are coupled as follows: From now
on, we will use D, Dg , S−g and their parameters with the
superscripts A for market A and B for market B. If we omit
the superscripts, then the setting is equal in both markets.
Equations 3 and 4 show D and S−g for markets A and B,
where [X]≥0 denotes the maximum of X and 0.
Figure 1. Market clearing. g’s bid bg is constrained by Dg and Qmaxg .
DA(ρ) :=
[
DAmax − αAρ
]
≥0
SA−g(ρ) :=
[
βA(ρ− ρAmin)
]
≥0
(3)
DB(ρ) :=
[
DBmax − αBρ
]
≥0
SB−g(ρ) :=
[
βB(ρ− ρBmin)
]
≥0
(4)
Two parameters of market B are determined by the
outcome of market A, while the other two remain freely
configurable. First, we assume that the maximal demand
in market B is related to QA via a ratio rm, such that
DBmax =
rmQ
A
1−rm . The SO can approximate the ratio rm by
experience. We assume for simplicity of our mechanism that
he approximates rm perfectly and allocates Qopt = DBmax.
Furthermore, we assume that he uses rm also for g in-
dividually, so it always holds that Qoptg =
rm∗QAg
1−rm . We
will evaluate scenarios with different values for rm and
assume in this work that g as well as (the aggregation
of) other generators are able to ramp up enough of their
capacity in time for balancing. In addition, we assume that
other generators bid the price they achieved in market A
as minimum price in market B, thus ρBmin = ρ
A
−g . By this
assumption, ρB−g ≥ ρA−g , which is a reasonable expectation,
because prices for balancing power are usually higher than
for power bought on an ahead market [11]. In our model,
there are now six settings free for parametrisation, namely
DAmax, α
A, βA, ρAmin, α
B and βB .
Finally, we model uncertainty about market outcomes.
g knows the residual demand functions DAg and D
B
g . From
g’s point of view, DAg and D
B
g shift up- or downward with
an independent motion in markets A and B. These shifts are
determined by noise parameters kA and kB , with which we
multiply the minimal price of the competition:
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Table I
SUMMARY OF MARKET PARAMETERS AND MARKET OUTCOMES. WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF rm AND Q
opt
g , WE USE THEM WITH SUPERSCRIPTS
A OR B TO DENOTE THEIR USAGE IN MARKET A OR B, RESPECTIVELY.
Parameter Description
Dmax maximal demand of demand function D
α slope of D
ρmin min. price of supply function S−g (g’s competition)
β slope of S−g
k noise parameter
rm describes ratio between QA and DBmax as well as
between QAg and Q
opt
g
Outcome Description
Qg , Q−g quantities that g and g’s competition sell
Qoptg quantity that g holds in reserve for market B
ρg , ρ−g prices that g and g’s competition earn
SA−g(ρ, k
A) = βA(ρ− ρAminkA)
SB−g(ρ, k
B) = βB(ρ− ρBminkB)
(5)
C. The profit maximisation problem
g has two bids to construct (we call them bAg and b
B
g ), one
for market A and one for market B. We now consider the
optimisation of bids in terms of profits for g. The profit in
each market is the revenues minus the total production costs.
In market A, revenues are QAg ∗ ρAg and the total costs of
producing QAg are given by Cg(Q
A
g ). In market B, revenues
are QBg ∗ ρBg . The total costs of producing QBg are the costs
for producing the last QBg units in Q
A
g +Q
B
g . Therefore, we
introduce a total cost function Cbalg for Q
B
g that calculates
the costs on Cg(QAg + Q
B
g ) for Q
B
g ∈ [0, Qoptg ]:
Cbalg (Q
A
g , Q
B
g ) = Cg(Q
A
g + Q
B
g )− Cg(QAg )
= (cg + 2RgQAg )Q
B
g + Rg(Q
B
g )
2
(6)
Then, the profit functions are:
profitsAg (b
A
g , k
A) = ρAg Q
A
g − Cg(QAg )
profitsBg (b
B
g , b
A
g , k
B) = ρBg Q
B
g − Cbalg (QAg , QBg )
(7)
where QAg and ρ
A
g are determined through market clearing
as described in Section III-B, when g submits the bid bAg to
market A, with kA being the noise variable and QUg (1−rm)
being g’s maximal capacity in market A. QBg and ρ
B
g are
likewise determined through market clearing when g submits
bid bBg to market B, with k
B being the noise variable and
Qoptg =
rm∗QAg
1−rm being g’s maximal capacity in market B.
Note that profitsBg is coupled to the results of market A
(and thus needs to consider bAg ), as Q
A
g is used in C
bal
g as
well as in the determination of Qoptg .
We now formulate the profit maximisation problem for
g. g considers limited ranges of noise parameters kA and
kB , [kAmin, k
A
max] and [k
B
min, k
B
max], respectively. For the
likelihood of kA and kB , let the two probability lookup
functions be probA(kA) → [0, 1] and probB(kB) → [0, 1].
The profit maximisation problem for bAg and b
B
g is shown
below. For each possible outcome for bid bAg , g considers
all possible outcomes for bid bBg .
arg max
bAg ,b
B
g
[∫ kAmax
kA=kA
min
probA(kA) ∗
(
profitsA(bAg , k
A)
+
∫ kBmax
kB=kB
min
probB(kB) ∗ profitsB(bBg , bAg , kB) dkB
)
dkA
]
(8)
IV. BID FORMATS
In the reference format (which we call BENCH), g
submits two independent bids: a bid bAg to market A, which
is a supply function of the format bAg (ρ) =
1
2Rg
∗ (ρ− c∗g),
and a bid bBg to market B, which is a constant price ρ
B∗
g .
In the unified bid format proposed in [5] (which we
call UNI), g bids only one bid bg(ρ) = 12Rg (ρ − c∗g).
First, the SO clears market A, using bg as bAg . Given the
outcome of market A (g sells QAg at unit price ρ
A
g =
bg
−1(QAg ) = c
∗
g + 2RgQ
A
g ), the SO then constructs bid
bBg from bg to submit to market B. b
B
g defines bg(ρ
B
g ) for
ρBg ∈ [ρAg , ρbg,max], where bg(ρbg,max) = QAg +Qoptg . bBg is
based on bg , with the minimal unit price (c∗g) replaced by ρ
A
g
(see bBg (ρ) in (9)). The UNI format reduces the complexity
of g’s optimisation problem by one dimension to only one
bid bg and thus simplifies the computation that a bidding
agent has to perform:
argmax
bg
[∫ kAmax
kA=kA
min
probA(kA) ∗
(
profitsAg (bg, k
A)
+
∫ kBmax
kB=kB
min
probB(kB) ∗ profitsBg (bBg , bg, kB) dkB
)
dkA
]
where bBg (ρ) =
1
2R g
(ρ− (c∗g + 2RgQAg ))
(9)
In contrast to the BENCH format, the UNI format
makes it possible to use the same bidding strategy on
market A and B. For instance, a marginal cost bid bg(ρ) =
1
2Rg
(ρ− cg) also bids marginal unit costs with bid bBg .
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We construct two market scenarios and investigate several
settings in each, using a systematic parameter analysis. In
each setting, g constructs bids for markets A and B. We
then investigate the resulting market outcome via Monte
Carlo simulations. To assess the effect of g’s decision on
the overall market, we measure an aggregated measure
of unit prices over both markets combined, dividing the
revenue of all suppliers by all sold power:
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ρAg ∗QAg + ρA−g ∗QA−g + ρBg ∗QBg + ρB−g ∗QB−g
QAg + QA−g + QBg + QB−g
(10)
Furthermore, we want to quantify g’s ability to prof-
itably alter prices away from competitive levels. To this
end, economists measure the market power of actors. We
measure market power by calculating the Lerner index
∈ [0, 1], defined by dividing per-unit profits by unit price.
As the index is defined for a monopolist, we multiply it by
g’s market share [13]:
lerner(Q) =
ρg( Q)− costsg( Q)
ρg( Q)
sm( Q) (11)
where ρg is the average unit price g earns when selling the
quantities Q = (QAg , Q
B
g ), costsg is the average production
costs per unit and sm is the market share. In our case:
ρg(QAg , Q
B
g ) =
QAg ρ
A
g + Q
B
g ρ
B
g
QAg + QBg
costsg(QAg , Q
B
g ) =
Cg(QAg + Q
B
g )
QAg + QBg
sm(QAg , Q
B
g ) =
QAg + Q
B
g
QAg + QA−g + QB−g + QBg
(12)
Besides market power and aggregated unit price, we also
measure g’s profits, prices ρAg , ρBg and quantities QAg , QBg .
A. Oligopolistic market scenario
First, we define an oligopolistic market scenario with
realistic settings from a wholesale power market simulation
study by Sun & Tesfatsion (2007) [14]. In [14], several
generators and a generic buyer profile are described for
24 hours of a day on an electricity wholesale market. In
particular, the oligopolistic scenario corresponds to hour 8
in that study (we chose hour 8 as it is similar to most other
hours and not an outlier). Because we use settings from
a wholesale market study, the prices in our model are in
$/MWh - but we note that the general findings of this model
can also hold for markets which trade KWh.
We parametrise g as a typical generator, according to [14].
We set cg = 18.8, Rg = 0.008 and QUg = 300.
For the parametrisation for D and S−g on the markets
A and B, Table II lists the default setting for this scenario,
which we discuss below, as well as variation ranges.
Furthermore, we run simulations with rm = 0.1, which
is a reserve level often in use today, as well as rm = 0.3, a
setting that is not unrealistic in the market scenarios we can
expect in the upcoming 10 years, at least for the generators
that can offer significant reserve power.
The sum of the demand of all buyers in [14] is 900,
or 3QUg . We set D
A
max = 3Q
U
g (1 − rm). The overall
Table II
DEFAULT SETTINGS AND VARIATION RANGES FOR MARKET
PARAMETERS IN THE OLIGOPOLISTIC SCENARIO. THE PARAMETERS
FOR MARKET B VARY IN DEPENDENCE TO THE PARAMETERS OF
MARKET A.
Name Default setting Variation range
DAmax 3Q
U
g (1− rm) = 810[rm : 0.1] [2QUg (1− rm),
= 630[rm : 0.3] 9QUg (1− rm)]
αA 1.0 [0.0, 5.0]
ρAmin 1.1cg = 20.68 [0.9cg , 1.5cg ]
βA 4
2Rg
= 250 [
DAmax
300
,
DAmax
15
]
DBmax
rmQ
A
1−rm
αB α
A
5
= 0.2
ρBmin ρ
A
−g
βB βA = 250
demand in market B depends on the sales of market A (see
Section III-B), thus we set DBmax =
rmQ
A
1−rm .
For the slope of the demand functions, we use a survey
report [8] of several demand responsiveness studies. All
studies in [8] measured the price elasticity of demand, which
denotes the percentage change in quantity demanded in
response to a one percent change in price. [8] distinguishes
between “long-run” and “short-run” demand, where the
latter allows less substitution of demanded power by any
alternative, similar to the situation in a balancing market.
The survey reports price elasticities between 0.7 and 2.1
for “long-run” scenarios (which we use for market A) and
between 0.03 and 0.5 in “short-run” scenarios (which we use
for market B). We take αA = 1.0 and αB = 0.2 = α
A
5 ).
Furthermore, [14] uses five generators in their model.
We assume that all generators have the same slope in their
production costs. Thus, we multiply the slope of g’s marginal
costs by four to get the slope of S−g: β = 42Rg . Finally, we
assume that the minimal unit price of S−g is 10% higher
than g’s minimal unit costs: ρAmin = 1.1cg . As described in
Section III-B, ρBmin is set to ρ
A
−g .
B. Competitive market scenario
To provide an outlook into market scenarios of the upcom-
ing 10 years, we also design a scenario with a competitive
market (which is more relevant smart grids), see Table III.
We base it on the oligopolistic scenario we described in
Section V-A. Here, we assume the number of players on
the supply side to be ten times higher and set β = 402Rg .
Furthermore, we also assume that demand responsiveness
is ten times higher and set αA = 10 and αB = 2. Both
assumptions are likely approximations, as the number of
suppliers as well as the demand responsiveness are very
low in current markets and are expected to increase rapidly
in future energy systems. Finally, we assume the overall
demand to be twice as high and set Dmax = 6QUg (1− rm).
This assumption is reasonable, because electricity demand
is expected to increase, especially with increasing market
107
Table III
DEFAULT SETTINGS AND VARIATION RANGES FOR MARKET
PARAMETERS IN THE COMPETITIVE SCENARIO.
Name Default setting Variation range
DAmax 6Q
U
g (1−rm) = 1620[rm : 0.1] [4QUg (1− rm),
= 1260[rm : 0.3] 18QUg (1− rm)]
αA 10 [5.0, 15.0]
ρAmin 1.1cg = 20.68 [0.9cg , 1.5cg ]
βA 40
2Rg
= 2500 [
DAmax
300
,
DAmax
15
]
DBmax
rmQ
A
1−rm
αB α
A
5
= 2
ρBmin ρ
A
−g
βB βA = 2500
penetration of electric vehicles. Also, the addition of storage
facilities to the power systems is both needed and expected.
C. Method
In order to systematically create parametrised settings in
both scenarios, we vary the values of one parameter at a time
while the others remain at the default setting. Per parameter,
we select 7 evenly-spaced values from a value range. We
vary rm ∈ [0.01, 0.4], Rg ∈ [0.001, 0.03], φ ∈ [0.0, 3.0] and
the market parameters DAmax, α
A, ρAmin and β
A according
to the variation intervals indicated in Tables II and III.
For each setting, g constructs either two bids bAg and
bBg (with the BENCH format) or one bid bg (with the
UNI format). First, g performs a brute-force search on bid
parameter settings: g evaluates 100 evenly-spaced values
for c∗g ∈ [cg, ρAmax] and, with the BENCH format, also
evaluates for each value of c∗g 100 evenly-spaced values
for ρB∗g ∈ [cg, ρBmax], where DAg (ρAmax, 1) = 0 and
DBg (ρ
B
max, 1) = 0, given Q
A
g = 0. Starting with the most
promising point from the brute force evaluations, g then
applies a downhill simplex algorithm [10] to maximise his
expected profits.
We sample the outcomes for each setting 100 times and
report the average results together with one standard devia-
tion in our graphs. Each sample uses a new pair of the noise
parameters kA and kB , generated by the Mersenne twister
pseudo-random number generation algorithm. We assume
kA and kB to be distributed normally and thus have to
choose means and standard deviations in both markets A and
B. We set the means to 1 and choose each standard deviation
s in the following way: We denote ρmax as the maximal unit
price in the market (such that Dg(ρmax, 1) = 0). We then
define s such that Dg(ρmin, 1+φs) = 0, where ρmin is the
minimal price of S−g (see Section III-B) and φ is a scaling
parameter (in default settings, φ = 1). The difference of
ρmax − ρmin is dependent on the market setting and also
differs in markets A and B. Thus, the noise in the market
is proportional to the maximal price variation in residual
demand. During the the profit maximisation problem, g
considers values for k ∈ [kmin = 1− 3s, kmax = 1 + 3s].
D. Results
We begin with confirming that, for several general eco-
nomic properties, the market model behaves as expected
in reality. First, g makes profits with both formats and
across all settings. Profits also correlate with settings like
one would expect. They are positively correlated to changes
in Rg , DAmax and ρ
A
min and negatively correlated to rm, α
A
and βA. Second, g’s presence increases competition as he
can offer electricity below market price. We simulated the
market without g (thus decreasing the number of suppliers
by one). As should be expected, the aggregated unit price
is significantly higher than with g’s presence. Finally, in
comparison to the oligopolistic scenario, the competitive
scenario has lower aggregated market prices, as well as
market power and profits for g.
We now turn to three major observations, concerning
notable differences or similarities in outcomes when g uses
either the BENCH or the UNI format:
Observation 1: The UNI format substantially re-
duces market prices and market power in exploitable
settings. In the default settings, the UNI and BENCH
format show no significant1 differences in market power.
The biggest opportunities for g to exercise market power
exist in settings with larger values for ρAmin, because then
the difference between offer prices of S−g and g’s costs is
high and g can thus increase his profit margin. The settings
in which ρAmin ≥ 24 show by far the highest aggregated
market prices, as well as market power and profits for g.
The differences in market power between the UNI and the
BENCH format are significant1, with the exception of the
baseline scenario where rm = 0.1. The results show that g
exploits this opportunity less when he uses the UNI format.
Specifically, g is lowering the price ρAg on market A, and
as a result the aggregated market prices are lower than with
the BENCH format (note that the most quantity is sold
on market A and thus lowering ρAg has strong effects). See
Figure 2 for the most substantial case, where the presence of
g when using the UNI format has an impact on aggregated
market prices up to 2.7 times as when g uses the BENCH
format. The results also show a clear reduction in market
power. In the default settings (ρAmin = 20.68), g has more
market power with the UNI format. However, in settings
with ρAmin ≥ 24, g gains substantially less market power
with respect to the default setting when using the UNI
format and therefore has less market power than with the
BENCH format. See Figure 3 for the most substantial case,
where the UNI format has up to 11% less market power.
Observation 2: The UNI format is stable against
noise. In the oligopolistic scenario, g has substantial market
power due to his position in this less competitive market
setting. If g can be less certain about market outcomes due
to increasing noise (note that we do not model noise for other
1We performed Student’s T-Tests and tested for p ≤ 0.01.
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Figure 2. Aggregated unit price against increasing competition prices
(competitive scenario, rm = 0.3). Results shown with +−1 standard
deviation. The dotted line indicates the default setting for φ.
Figure 3. Market power against increasing competition prices (competitive
scenario, rm = 0.3). Note the scale of the y-axis.
market participants), his market power decreases when he is
using the BENCH format, but stays constant (on average)
with the UNI format (see Figure 4 for an example).
Observation 3: In all other settings, the UNI format
has comparable impacts on overall market outcomes.
Although the formats are constructed differently and show
distinct bidding behaviour (in the simulated settings not
covered in observation 1 and 2, the UNI format sells less
QBg at a higher price ρ
B
g , see Figure 5 for an example), the
impact of g on market prices does not differ significantly1
when g uses the UNI or BENCH format (if noise is at
least as high as in the default setting). From the perspective
of the market, the UNI format thus shows no substantial
drawback in these cases.
E. Discussion and future work
Let us first consider why the BENCH format bids
lower prices on market B (see observation 3 and Figure 5).
Given his bid bAg on market A, g searches for the bid b
B
g
Figure 4. Market power against increasing uncertainty of g about market
outcomes (oligopolistic scenario, rm = 0.3).
Figure 5. Sampled outcomes for g (oligopolistic scenario, rm = 0.3).
that maximises the expected profits. Because bBg reflects a
constant price ρB∗g , an unexpectedly low residual demand
function (a result of a low value for kB) can decrease QBg
dramatically (especially when the slope of DBg is high).
Thus, the BENCH format bids a lower value for ρB∗g to
stabilise the expected amount QBg . Specifically, consider a
deterministic setting (kA = kB = 1): g maximises profits
by selling QBg = Q
opt
g at price ρ, where D
B
g (ρ, k
B) = Qoptq
for kB = 1. However, in a non-deterministic setting, the
BENCH format bids a price ρB∗g lower than ρ. This also
explains observation 2: The higher the uncertainty about
market outcomes, the lower g will bid on market B when
using the BENCH format. As the UNI format is bidding
a function instead of a constant price, it does not face
this problem and has stable market power. This makes the
UNI format appealing to bidders, as it is less vulnerable to
increasing uncertainty about market outcomes.
We now turn to observation 1 and discuss bidding be-
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haviour under exploitable market settings (here modelled
by large values for ρAmin). In most settings we studied,
multiple near-optimal combinations of quantities and prices
exist. Though the UNI format is less flexible than the
BENCH format (because bids bAg and b
B
g are based on one
bid bg), it is likely to find a bid bg that realises one of them,
as is evident in the good performance across all settings.
However, the market settings in question (with ρAmin ≥ 24)
are so favourable for g that he can sell all capacity on
both markets (QAg = Q
U
g (1 − rm) and QBg = Qoptg ). This
means that there exists only one pair of optimal quantities
(QUg (1 − rm) and Qoptg ) and the optimisation problem is
reduced to finding the optimal prices. However, if QAg is
fixed, the distance between bids bAg and b
B
g with regard to
the price axis is fixed as well (because the minimum price of
bBg is c
∗
g+2RgQ
A
g , see (9)). Thus, it becomes highly unlikely
that g can bid optimal prices in both markets. We conclude
that under very favourable conditions for g, the UNI format
restricts g from realising the full potential market power. As
a result, the UNI format lowers bid bAg substantially in order
to not overprice on market B. This makes the UNI format
appealing to market makers, as it restricts the exercise of
excessive market power in exploitable market settings.
The decision-theoretic approach taken in this work gives
first insights into this complex problem setting. However,
future work could further evaluate the UNI format in a
multi-agent setting. By including the decision-making of
multiple actors, the social efficiency improvements can be
studied in more detail. In addition, certain assumptions may
be loosened. First, individual ratios rg per bidder would
model a more dynamic market setting. Each bidder would
decide how much flexibility he actually can offer, depending
on his portfolio as well as adaptive strategies, where for
example rg = 0 means that g is not taking part in market B.
If suppliers bid on several rg values, the SO can increase
market efficiency by choosing among them (see also [5]).
Second, bidders can be allowed to adjust both bid parameters
(see Section III-A and one might investigate the usefulness
of strategies that rely on this. Finally, it is important to
consider the bid format for the demand side, as well. In
a companion work (currently under review), which is more
tailored to the electrical engineering community, we model
a flexible consumer and formulate the problem such that he
bids a demand bid on market A and a supply bid on market
B, offering to reduce his planned consumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work analyses the decision problem of a smart bid-
ding agent in a two-settlement electricity auction. It provides
a parametrised, stochastic market model with discriminatory
bids. The profit maximisation problem of a generator is
formalised and studied with Monte-Carlo simulations and
careful parameter analysis. We model the current state-
of-the-art bid format and incorporate a novel format that
enables simpler computation by agents through unification of
the two bids. Experimental simulations show that the unified
format restricts market power of suppliers in exploitable
market settings, and is also less vulnerable to increasing
uncertainty of bidders about market outcomes.
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